Treu v. Kirkwood [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
4-1-1954
Treu v. Kirkwood [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Treu v. Kirkwood [DISSENT]" (1954). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 257.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/257
602 'l1REU V. KIRKWOOD [42 0.2d 
[Sac. No. 6282. In Bank. Apr. 1, 1954.] 
F'LORENZ TREU, Respondent, v. ROBERT C. KIRKWOOD, 
as State Controller, et al., Appellants. 
[1] Public to Compel Payment 
-Pleading-Variance.-In mandamus proceeding to compel 
payment of noncivil service employee's claim against the state 
for compensating time off which employee alleged was promised 
her for overtime hours worked in addition to her normal hours 
of work in office of lieutenant governor, the alleged promise 
is not established by proof that she was told that it would be 
impossible for her to take any time off because of increased 
amount of work, and that promise made to her was that she 
should be paid for overtime. 
[2] Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Variance and Proof. 
-Under Code Civ. Proc., §§ 469,475, and Const., art. VI,§ 4%, 
not every variance between pleading and proof necessitates 
reversal of a judgment, but only where there has been a mis-
carriage of justice or substantial rights of appellant have been 
affected thereby. 
[3] Public Officers-Compensation-Mandamus to Compel Payment 
-Pleading-Variance.-In mandamus proceeding to compel 
state controller and state treasurer to pay employee's claim 
against state for compensating time off, respondents were not 
misled to their prejudice by a variance in petition alleging 
promise by 1lieutenant governor to give petitioner such time 
off for overtime hours worked and proof that she was not 
promised time off but was promised that she would be paid for 
overtime, where they anticipated proof of a contract for pay-
ment for overtime work and introduced evidence to show that 
no such contract had been approved, and where petition, 
liberally construed, demanded payment for overtime work for 
which compensation in some form had been promised. 
[4] Id.--Compensation-Terminology.-The words "salary" and 
"compensation" are, in general usage, interchangeable and are 
synonymous in most definitions, and while term "salary" in its 
original and strict sense signifies a fixed compensation, it is 
frequently used in our Constitution and laws as equivalent of 
"compensation." 
[5] Id.- Compensation- Terminology. -Reading Gov. Code, 
~ 18004, requiring approval of Department of Finance before 
[ 4] See Am.Jur., Public Officers, § 340. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Public O.fficers, § 116(5); [2] Ap-
peal and Error, § 1521; [ 4, 5, 7, 8, 10] Public 0 fficers, § 97; [ 6] 
State of California, § 18; [9] Public Officers, ~§ 116(5), 116(6); 
[11] Appeal and Error,§ 1230(2) (6). 
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any state agency fixes 
it is obvious that words 
or compensation of an employee, 
and "compensation" are there 
used as being synonymous. 
[6] State of California-Fiscal Matters.-The purpose of Gov. 
Code, § 13070, to Department of Finance powers 
of supervision over nwtters concerning financial and business 
policies of the is to conserve financial interests of the 
state, to prevent and to control expenditure of 
state money any state department. 
[7] Public Officers-Compensation-Validity of Contracts Govern-
ing.-A contract fixing matters relating to pay and working 
conditions of a state employee which has not been approved by 
Department of Finance in accordance with Gov. Code, § 18004, 
is invalid. 
[8] !d.-Compensation-Validity of Contracts Governing.-Under 
Gov. Code, § 13370, declaring that all contracts entered into 
by a state agency for services are of no effect unless approved 
by Department of Finance, a contract to pay secretary of 
lieutenant governor for her services beyond normal working 
hours, regardless of whether payment be considered "com-
pensation" or "salary" or both, is invalid if lacking approval 
by department. 
[9a, 9b] Id.- Compensation- Mandamus to Compel Payment-
Pleading: Hearing-Findings.--Where conflicting inferences 
could he drawn from evidence as to whether Department of 
Pimmce had approveil claim of secretary of lieutenant governor 
for additional compt>nsation for overtime work, and where this 
issue was essential to a determination of mandamus proceeding 
to compel state controller and state treasurer to pay such 
claim, shP should have alleged in petition for mandate that 
her claim was for overtime approved by Department of Finance 
and such issue should have been determined by the findings. 
[10] Id.- Compensation- Overtime.-Where monthly salary of 
secretary of lieutenant governor is payment in full for all of 
her services, without regard to number of hours which she 
worked, she is not entitled, in absence of a valid contract or 
statute, to payment for overtime. 
[11] Appeal-Making and Taking Evidence.-Although 
an appellate court is empowered to make findings of fact and 
to take evidence in gupport of a judgment (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 956a), generally it will not do so when evidence before trial 
court is conflicting; and where evidence in favor of one party 
is not clearly persuasive and there is no indication as to trial 
judge's appraisal of evidence, the judgment should be reversed 
[10] See Cal.Jur., Public Ofil.cers, § 106; Am.Jur., Public Officers, 
§ 341 et seq. 
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for a new trial in order that there rnay he a 
lSSUe. 




in mandamus to allowance of claim for 
overtime worked by former of lieutenant governor. 




James H. Phillips for R.espondent. 
General, for 
EDMONDS, J.-From 1947 to 1949, Florenz 'freu was a 
noncivil service employee in the ofiice of the lieutenant gov-
ernor. By writ of mandate, the state controller and the 
treasurer have been ordered to approve and pay her claim 
''for overtime worked . . . for which petitioner was not com-
pensated and was not given compensating time off.'' The 
appeal is from that judgment. 
In her petition for a writ of mandate, Miss Treu alleged that, 
prior to the time the ·work 'Nas performed, the lieutenant gov-
ernor had established normal offiee hours and promised her 
compensating time off for work those hours. All over-
time work was authorized by the lieutenant governor, she said, 
and she did not receive time off or any other compensation 
for such work, nor was any offered to or refused by her. Ac-
cording to the petitioner, a claim for the cash equiva-
lent of the accumulated overtime hours at the time of her 
separation was filed by the lieutenant governor and approved 
for payment by the State Personnel Board, but the controller 
refused to issue a warrant. 
By their answer, the controller and treasurer denied that 
any amount was due for overtime. alleged that Miss 
'l'reu was exempt from, and never held a position in, the state 
civil service. Her salary, said, was fixed the lieutenant 
governor with the approval of the Department of Finance at a 
monthly rate which was in full and no salary or compen-
sation on any other basis, or in any form other than cash, was 
authorized by the department. 
Miss 'l'reu was appointed secretary to the lieutenant governor 
on March 1, 1947, in which capacity she served for one year. 
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She then became executive secretary. Her employment was 
terminated by resignation on August 1, 1949. In both posi-
tions she was exempt from civil service. During her employ-
ment, her fixed on a monthly basis with the approval 
of the Department of Finance, progressively increased from 
$275 to $436 per month. 
·when Miss Treu commenced her work for the lieutenant 
governor, he fixed office hours from 9 a.m. to 5 :30 p.m. on week 
and from 9 a. m. to noon on Saturdays. At the begin-
of her employment, he told her, she testified, ''that there 
was a terrific amount of work in the office and he knew I was 
going to work a lot of overtime, and that I was going to be 
paid for the overtime that I worked.'' She was informed'' that 
she would be paid for the overtime as it would be impossible 
for her to take any time off because of the increased amount 
of work.'' 
Thereafter, the lieutenant governor wrote to the Department 
of Finance requesting a salary increase for his staff upon the 
basis that two employees "have taken over and are doing the 
work that a staff of three people performed previous to my 
administration. Because of their willingness to assume this 
additional responsibility, I feel they should be compensated 
accordingly.'' He suggested that the appropriation for his 
office was sufficient to increase their salaries and stated: ''I do 
not intend to further add to my staff as long as Mr. Mydland 
and Miss Treu continue doing the work that has required three 
people.'' In response to this request, the director of finance 
approved a salary increase for Miss Treu. .All of her salary 
was paid in full. 
Prior to the filing of the claim which is the basis of this pro-
ceeding, the Department of Finance had not fixed or approved 
salary or compensation for Miss Treu on other than a monthly 
basis, or in amounts different than her agreed monthly salary, 
nor did it approve compensation in any form other than cash 
or fix normal working hours for her. .An official record was 
maintained in the lieutenant governor's office showing hours 
which she worked in addition to normal office hours . .All such 
work was authorized by the lieutenant governor, and she was 
at no time granted compensating time off for these hours. 
Upon her separation from service, a claim for payment for 
overtime was approved by the State Personnel Board. While 
the claim was pending in the controller's office, a letter from 
the attorney general was forwarded to the controller by the 
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director of finance. The attorney general's letter set forth 
seven facts upon which it said the validity of the claim would 
depend. Among these were that the lieutenant governor had 
established normal hours of work for Miss Treu and that he 
promised her compensating time off for extra hours worked. 
The covering letter from the director of finance stated that: 
''The seven items . . . have been substantiated, and 
there is available in our files the required letters and affidavits 
making the required substantiation." Thereafter, the claim 
was rejected by the controller and this proceeding was com-
menced. 
Upon this the trial court found the allegations 
of the petition to be true. Judgment was entered directing 
that a peremptory writ of mandate issue commanding the 
respondents to approve and pay her claim. 
In support of their appeal, the respondents contend that 
the finding that Miss Treu was promised compensating time off 
for overtime work is not supported by the evidence. In addi-
tion, they say, the judgment may not be sustained upon the 
theory of a contract to pay cash compensation for overtime 
\YOrk because no such contract was approved by the department 
of finance as required by statute. They argue that, in the 
absence of either a valid contract or a statutory provision, Miss 
'l'reu 's monthly salary was payment in full for all of her 
services during each month, regardless of the number of hours 
worked. Other objections made by the respondents are that 
the trial court failed to find upon certain material issues and 
that other findings are not supported by the evidence. This 
court is requested to make findings of fact to conform to the 
proof. A final contention is that, even if Miss Treu is entitled 
to a cash payment for overtime work, it should be computed 
upon the basis of her salary at the time the work was per-
formed, rather than her salary at the time of separation. 
Miss Treu relies upon Howard v. Lampton, 87 Cal.App.2d 
449 [197 P.2d 69], and Clm·lc v. State Personnel Board, 56 
Cal.App.2d 499 [133 P.2d 11], holding that in the absence of 
statute, a state employee is entitled to payment upon separa-
tion from service for properly authorized overtime work. She 
also contends that a promise of compensating time off is not 
a prerequisite to payment for overtime. Even if it is, she says, 
the promise by the lieutenant governor to pay her for over-
time work may be construed as a promise to give her compen-
sating time off. In addition, she disputes each of the other 
contentions of the respondents. 
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In Martin v. Henderson and Heclwine v. 40 Cal. 
P.2d Howard and Clark decisions 
authority, is entitled 
to payment for accrued overtime upon separation from service. 
Therefore, the here is whether there was contractual 
or statutory authority for payment to Miss Treu for overtime 
services. 
[1] 'l'he petition specifically alleges a promise by the lieu-
tenant governor to give Miss Treu ''compensating time off for 
overtime hours worked in addition to her normal hours of 
work.'' 'l'he court found that the promise was made. How-
ever, the letter from the lieutenant governor to the Depart-
ment of Finance and Miss 'l'reu 's own testimony, shows con-
clusively that she was not promised time off. She was told that 
"it would be impossible for her to take any time off because 
of the increased amount of work'' The promise made to her 
was ''that she would be paid for the overtime.'' 
The respondents contend that this amounted to a failure of 
proof within the meaning of section 471 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, rather than a mere variance. They rely upon 
Gillin v. Hopkins, 28 Cal.App. 579, 580-582 [153 P. 724], which 
held that evidence of a contract to accept payment in stock 
constituted failure of proof of a cause of action upon an agree-
ment to pay a designated sum of money. The situation is 
analogous to that here. Obviously, a promise to grant com-
pensating time off is far different from a promise to pay cash 
for overtime work. However," (n)o variance between the alle-
gation in a pleading and the proof is to be deemed material, 
unless it has actually misled the adverse party to his prejudice 
in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits.'' (Code 
Civ. Proc. § 469.) 
[2] "The code also provides that the court must, in every 
stage of an action (and that means ou appeal, as well as in 
the trial of the cause), disregard any error, improper ruling 
or defect in the pleadings or proceedings, which, in the opinion 
of the court, does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
It must appear from the record that the error, improper ruling 
or defect was prejudicial and caused substantial injury before 
the judgment rendered may be reversed or be held to be affected 
by it; and it must further appear that a different result would 
have been probable if such error, ruling or defect had not 
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occurred or exisLed. (Code § '175.) Not do 
these code sections this under such eircum-
to determine from an examination of the entire record, 
whether or not there has been a of justice before 
reversing a judgment, but the state constitution is equally man-
datory and imperative. ( Const. § art. VI.) It therefore 
indubitably follovvs that it is not every variance that will neces-
sitate the overthrow of a " v. Le JYles-
nager, 207 Cal. 485, 495 [279 P. 800].) 
It is obvious from a review of the record in this case 
that the respondents were not misled to their prejudice. They 
anticipated proof of a contract for payment for overtime work 
and introduced evidence to show that no such contract had 
been approved. In addition, the adequately apprised 
the respondents of the claim which would he ealled upon 
to meet. It alleged that "at the time of said separation from 
said State employment petitioner herein had accumulated and 
was entitled to be in cash the State of California for 
overtime worked while an of the said Lieutenant 
Governor in the total sum of ~ri3,076.53." Construed liberally, 
as must be done (Code Civ. Proc. § , the petition demanded 
payment for overtime work for which compensation in some 
form had been promised. Under the circumstances, it cannot 
be said that the variance is so material as to require a reversal 
of the judgment. (Hayes v, Oil Corp., 38 Cal.2d 375, 
382 [240 P.2d 580] .) 
Although there is no evidence to support the finding that 
Miss 'l'reu was promised compensating time off for overtime 
work, the record includes evidence tending to prove an 
agreement for payment in cash for work beyond normal 
office hours. However, the respondents argue that the judg-
ment cannot be sustained upon this theory because no such 
contract was approved by the Department of Finance as re-
quired by statute. 
Miss Treu was appointed under the authority of section 
12101 of the Government Code which provides: ''The Lieuten-
ant Governor may appoint subject to the approval of the 
Director of :B'inance, fix the salaries of one secretary and such 
clerical assistants as the Lieutenant Governor deems necessary 
for his office.'' 'I'he salary basis fixed by the lieutenant gov-
ernor for Miss Treu and by the director of finance 
was one for monthly compensation without any authorization 
of additional payment for overtime. 
Miss Treu contends that no approval by the Department of 
1954] TREU v. KIRKWOOD 
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i''inance is necessary to permit the payment of compensation 
for overtime. Her position, however, is directly contrary to the 
express provisions of section 18004 of the Government Code. 
At the time she commenced her employment, that section read: 
"Unless the Legislature specifically provides that approval of 
the Department of Finance is not required, whenever any State 
agency ... fixes the salary or compensation of an employee 
... which salary is payable in whole or in part out of State 
funds, the salary is subject to the approval of the Department 
of li'inance before it becomes effective and payable.'' The 
office of lieutenant governor is included within the term ''State 
agency." (Gov. Code, § 11000.) 
[ 4] 'l'he words "salary" and "compensation" are, in 
general usage, interchangeable and are synonymous in most 
definitions. "Compensation" is " [ t ]he remuneration or wages 
given to an employee or, especially, to an officer. Salary, 
pay, or emolument." (Black's Law Diet., 4th ed., p. 
354.) Likewise, "salary" is defined as "a stated compensa-
tion, amounting to so much by the year, month, or other 
fixed period, to be paid to public officers and persons in 
some private employments, for the performance of official 
duties or the rendering of services of a particular kind.'' 
(Black's Law Diet., 4th ed., p. 1503.) "While the term 
salary in its original and strict sense signifies a fixed 
compensation it is frequently used in our constitution and 
laws as the equivalent of compensation." (Mart~~n v. County 
of Santa Barbara, 105 Cal. 208, 212 [38 P. 687] .) 
[ 5] From the wording o£ section 18004 read with reference 
to related statutory provisions, it is obvious that "salary" 
and ''compensation'' are there used as being synonymous. 
Section 13070 of the Government Code provides that the De-
partment o£ Finance ''has general powers of supervision over 
all matters concerning the financial and business policies of 
the State." [6] The purpose of the latter section "is to 
conserve the financial interests of the state, to prevent im-
providence, and to control the expenditure of state money 
by any of the several departments of the state. (Ireland v. 
Riley, 11 Cal.App.2d 70, 72 [52 P.2d 1021].)" (State v. 
Brotherhood of R. Trainmen, 37 Cal.2d 412, 422 [232 P.2d 
857] .) [7] Therefore, a contract fixing rates of pay and 
working conditions, which has not been approved by the 
department in accordance with section 18004, is invalid. (State 
v. Brotherhood of R. Trainmen, supra.) 
42 C.2d-20 
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the for the depart-
contracts for ''compensation'' and 
"salary" is reference to section 13370 of the 
Government at the time Miss Treu was hired, 
provided: ''All contracts entered into by any state agency 
... for services ... are of no effect unless and until ap-
proved by the Department of Finance." Under this section, a 
contract to pay Miss Treu for her services beyond normal 
working hours, regardless of whether payment be considered 
''compensation'' or ''salary,'' or would be invalid if 
lacking the approval specified by the statute. 
In her petition in this proceeding, Miss Treu did not allege 
that the Department of :B'inance had authorized the payment 
to her of any amount for overtime work. The respondents 
pleaded in defense of her claim that no such authorization 
had been made. 
[9a] rrhe evidence concerning the action taken by the De-
partment of Finance shows that while Miss Treu 's claim was 
pending before the controller, several letters were written 
to the controller regarding it. Although in some of them, 
a request was made to the controller to withhold payment 
pending the determination by the department of certain facts, 
none of them placed the request upon the ground that the 
department had not given its approval to the working of extra 
hours. From this correspondence, it might reasonably be 
inferred that the department tacitly approved the claim ex-
cept for the specific irregularities mentioned. One letter 
to the controller referred to an opinion of the attorney gen-
eral listing the items necessary to establish the validity of 
the claim. Included in these prerequisites was proof "that 
the employee was authorized to and did work the extra hours 
claimed.'' The department stated to the controller that the 
authorizations enumerated by the attorney general "have 
been substantiated, and there is available in our files the 
required letters and affidavits making the required substantia-
tion.'' Although the documents received in evidence tend to 
show that the authorization to which reference was made ·was 
only that of the lieutenant governor, they do not compel that 
conclusion, and it might reasonably be inferred that the de-
partment had also approved the arrangement made by him. 
On the other hand, there is evidence from which it reason-
ably could be concluded that the department gave no such 
approval. Fred W. Links, Assistant Director of Finance and 
chief of the division of budgets and accounts, was a witness 
Apr.1954] TREU v. KIRKWOOD 
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for Miss Treu. He testified that his division handled her 
claim. Asked if the Department of Finance approved it, he 
answered that the function of his division was not to pass 
upon its validity; " [ w] hat we did was merely to to the 
State Controller, as we had requested him to withhold 
the drawing of the warrant for thereof until we had 
substantiated the facts.'' Asked if the department fixed or 
approved compensation for Miss Treu other than on 
her regular monthly basis, or if it fixed or provided for com-
pensating time off for overtime hours, he replied that it did 
not do so. Although this testimony tends strongly to show 
a lack of approval, it too is not conclusive upon the issue. 
It may be that Links was speaking of a formal approval; 
also, there might have been a departmental approval made 
without his knowledge. 
Miss Treu pleaded and tried her case entirely upon a 
theory of contract but she now contends that no promise 
of time off was necessary to entitle her to recover. She 
concedes that section 18005 of the Government Code, au-
thorizing payment upon separation for accumulated over-
time, was inapplicable to employees exempt from civil service 
during the period in question. However, she refers to Govern-
ment Code, sections 18023 and 18024, and rule 133 of the 
Personnel Board which provide for the adoption of rules 
governing hours of work and the granting of time off in lieu 
of cash compensation for overtime. But she does not claim, 
nor does the record indicate, that she was within those statu-
tory or regulatory provisions or that any statute entitled 
her to payment for overtime. Instead, she argues that no 
statutory authority is essential to permit her recovery. This 
point has been decided adversely to her in Martin v. Hender-
son, supra. 
[10] In the absenee of either a valid contract or statute, 
there is no basis for a recovery by Miss Treu. Her monthly 
salary was payment in full for all of her services, without 
regard to the number of hours which she worked. (Martin 
v. Henderson, stlpra; Jarvis v. Henderson, 40 Cal.2d 600 
[255 P.2d 426] ; Robinson v. Dunn, 77 Cal. 473 [19 P. 878, 11 
Am.St.Rep. 297].) 
[9b] In summary, from the evidence presented, conflicting 
inferences could be drawn as to whether or not the Department 
of Finance has approved Miss Treu 's claim. The issue is 
essential to a determination of this proceeding. It should 
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have been alleged in the petition for mandate and determined 
by the findings. (Of. Delany v. Toomey, 111 Cal.App.2d 
570, 571-573 [245 P.2d 26] .) However, no such finding was 
made. The trial court found that all of the allegations of 
the petition are true. But Miss Treu did not charge that her 
claim was for overtime approved by the department. The 
answer asserted, by way of defense, that there was no such 
approval, and the allegations in each paragraph of the answer 
were found to be untrue only ''so far as they deny the 
allegations in" the particular paragraph of the petition being 
answered. 
The situation then is that the issue as to approval by the 
department of finance, fully pleaded in the respondent's 
answer, ·was not considered by Miss Treu or the trial judge 
to be the determinative factor basic to any recovery. Her 
position, undoubtedly taken in reliance upon the Clark and 
Howard decisions, which since have been disapproved, waE 
that authorization by the Department of Finance was not a 
prerequisite. In her brief she says : ''The court is reminded 
that there was no legal requirement for the Department of 
Finance to approve the working hours of petitioner or the 
approving of compensation for overtime.'' 
The memorandum opinion of the trial judge clearly shows 
that he did not believe that a promise to pay an employee 
additional compensation for extra time must be approved by 
the Department of Finance to make the state liable for the 
payment of it. As he construed section 18004 of the Govern-
ment Code, it requires approval by the Department of Finance 
only of salary. "It is true," he said "that the statute states 
'salary or compensation' but later each one of the clauses 
refers only to the word 'salary'. 'l'his court does not feel 
that that statute is subject to the broad interpretation which 
respondent puts upon it. We are of the opinion that the words 
'salary or compensation' are used as interchangeable terms, 
but that a lump sum to be paid in lieu of compensating time 
off is not such 'compensation' as is meant there.'' Un-
doubtedly, that construction of the statute is the reason why 
no finding as to the approval by the department was made. 
[11] Although an appellate court is empowered to make 
findings of fact and to take evidence in support of a judg-
ment (Code Civ. Proc., § 956a), generally it will not do so 
when the evidence before the trial court is conflicting. (People 
v. One 194D Ford V-8 Coupe, 41 Cal.2d 123, 127 [257 P.2d 
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. ) This latter rule is not without exception ( cf. J okn-
drow v. Thomas, 31 Cal.2d 202, 207 [187 P.2d 681); Gudger 
v. 21 Cal.2d 537, 547 [134 P.2d 217]), but where, 
as in the present case, the evidence in favor of one party 
is not clearly persuasive, and there is no indication as to 
the trial judge's appraisal of the evidence, the judgment 
should be reversed for a new trial in order that there may 
be a finding upon the issue. 
'rhe judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The judicial history of this case should be of interest 
to the public as well as to practicing attorneys. Miss Treu 
filed a petition for a writ of mandate to compel payment to 
her by the controller and treasurer of the State of Cali-
fornia of compensation for overtime promised her by her 
employer, Lieutenant Governor Knight, now Governor" of the 
state. Her petition was granted by the trial court and affirmed 
by the District Court of Appeal. ( (Cal.App.) 240 P.2d 32.) 
This court granted the state's petition for hearing and ren-
dered its first decision on April 3, 1953. That decision, which 
reversed the trial court, held that the contract entered into 
between 1\{iss Treu and her employer was invalid for lack 
of approval by the Department of :F'inance. Mr. Justice 
Schauer and I flied separate dissenting opinions. On May 1, 
1953, this court granted a rehearing with Chief Justice Gibson, 
Justices Shenk, Schauer and me voting therefor. 
The present opinion holds, in accordance with my former 
dissent, that the evidence presented is sufficient to show a 
tacit or implied approval by the department of finance of 
the contract entered into between Miss Treu and her em-
ployrr, the then lieutenant governor. In direct conflict with 
the former opinion, it is now held by a majority of this court 
that ''conflicting inferences could be drawn as to whether 
or not the Department of Finance has approved Miss Treu 's 
claim. The issue is essential to a determination of this proceed-
ing." In the former opinion, the majority did not even 
recognize that there was any evidence tending to show an 
approval by the department. The record is the same now as 
it was then. However, the majority now reverse on the 
ground that the trial court made no finding as to departmental 
approval or lack thereof. With this I cannot agree. 
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:B'lorenz was a former employee 
uf the former lieutenant governor. She was appointed secre-
on JYiarch 1947, and served in that position until 
JYiarch 1st, when she was appointed to the position of 
executive On August 1949, she terminated 
her with the lieutenant governor. She was 
exempt, her tenure in both from civil ser-
vice and its After the termination of her em-
ployment, she mandate proceedings in the Superior 
Court of Sacramento County against the state controller 
and state treasurer to compel them to allow a claim filed 
by her against the state in the sum of $3,076.53. This sum 
represented the cash value of compensating time off which 
she alleged had been promised her for overtime worked while 
she was employed by the lieutenant governor but which had 
not been received by her prior to her separation. 'l'he state 
appeals from a judgment directing that the claim be paid. 
Section 12101 of the Government Code provides that "The 
Lieutenant Governor may appoint and, subject to the ap-
proval of the Director of Finance, fix the salaries of one 
secretary and such clerical assistants as the Lieutenant 
Governor deems necessary for his office.'' During the time 
JYiiss Treu worked for the lieutenant governor, her salary was 
fixed with the approval of the Department of Finance on a 
monthly basis in amounts which progressively increased from 
$275 per month to $436 per month. This salary has all 
been paid. Regular hours of work were established by the 
lieutenant governor as follows: 9 a. m. to 5 :30 p. m., Mon-
days through Fridays, and 9 a. m. to 12 noon on Saturdays. 
JYiiss Treu kept a record showing the extra hours she worked 
and these were recorded on the monthly attendance report 
forms. The extra hours were authorized to be worked by the 
lieutenant governor and were supported by Authorization for 
Overtime Form 682. After separation from her employment 
without having been paid for the overtime work and with-
out having received compensating time off, Miss Treu pre-
pared a claim for payment which was approved by the State 
Personnel Board and, when later presented to the state con-
troller was by him rejected. 'l'hereafter these proceedings 
were commenced. 
The state first contends that the finding of the trial court 
that JYiiss Treu was promised compensating time off for 
overtime work is not supported by the evidence. It is 
argued that the promise made to JYiiss Treu was not for com-
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pensating time off but for a cash payment in lieu thereof. 
'l'his argument has merit. The record shows that Miss Treu 
was told by the lieutenant governor that due to the pressure 
of work it would be impossible for her to take time off but 
that she would be for her overtime work. This testimony 
was substantiated a letter from the lieutenant governor 
to the Department of Finance. The state contends that this 
constitutes a failure of and cites, as authority, Gillin 
v. Hopkins, 28 Cal.App. 579 [153 P. 724], wherein it was 
held that evidence of a contract to accept payment in stock 
constituted failure of proof of a cause of action upon an 
agreement to pay a designated sum of money. It is provided, 
however, in section 469 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that 
no variance between the allegation in a pleading and the 
proof is to be deemed material unless it has actually misled 
the adverse party to his prejudice in maintaining his action 
or defense on the merits. Miss Treu 's petition alleged that 
she was entitled to be paid in cash for overtime work and 
the state could not have been misled inasmuch as it in-
troduced evidence tending to prove that no contract made 
with Miss Treu for payment for overtime work had been 
approved by the Department of Finance. vVe said in Hayes 
v. Richfield Oil Corp., 38 Cal.2d 375, 382 [240 P.2d 580], 
that " [a] variance between the allegations of a pleading and 
the proof will not be deemed material unless it has actually 
misled the adverse party to his prejudice in maintaining 
his action or defense on the merits, and a variation may be 
disregarded where the action has been as fully and fairly 
tried on the merits as though the variance had not existed.'' 
And in Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal.2d 480, 486 [196 P.2d 915], 
v;e said: "that a variance is immaterial and may be dis-
regarded where the case was as fully and fairly tried upon 
the merits as though the variance had not existed." In view 
of the pleading heretofore referred to and the proof adduced 
by both parties, it is at once apparent that the state was not 
misled to its prejudice. Further, the evidence is more than 
sufficient to show that Miss Treu was promised compensation 
for overtime work by the lieutenant governor. 
The state argues, however, that no snch contract is valid 
unless approved by the Department of Finance as required 
by the provision:o; of section 18004 of the Government Code 
(as the section read at the time she began work). That sec-
tion provides that "Unless the Legislature specifically pro-
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vides that approval of the Department of Finance is not 
required, whenever any State agency [in which the office of 
Lieutenant Governor is included, Gov. Code, § 11000] ... 
fixes the salary or compensation of an employee . . . which 
salary is payable in whole or in part out of State funds, the 
salary is subject to the approval of the Department of 
Finance before it becomes effective and payable.'' 
It may be taken for granted that the words "salary" and 
''compensation'' are synonymous for the purpose of this dis-
cussion. (Martin v. County of Santa Barbara, 105 Cal. 208, 
212 [38 P. 687].) 
In State v. Brotherhood of R. 'Trainmen, 37 Cal.2d 412, 421, 
422 [232 P.2d 857], it was held that a state agency could not 
bind the state for wages or salary without the approval of the 
Department of Finance. The question of approval by the De-
partment of Finance was the subject of conflicting evidence. 
In support of the determination reached by the trier of fact 
that Miss 'l'reu was entitled to compensation for overtime, the 
record contains a letter from the state attorney general to the 
Department of Finance in which he set forth seven facts upon 
which he felt the validity of Miss Treu 's claim rested. He 
wrote '' [ w] hether or not the claim is valid under the rule of 
that case [Clark v. State Personnel Board, 56 Cal.App.2d 499 
( 133 P .2d 11)] is dependent, in addition to the facts shown 
above, upon the existence of the following facts : ( 1) that the 
lieutenant governor did establish normal hours of work for 
the employee; (2) that he did promise the employee compen-
sating time off for extra hours worked; (3) that this promise 
was made prior to the time they were worked; ( 4) that the 
employee was authorized to and did work the extra hours 
claimed; ( 5) that she did not receive compensating time off or 
other compensation for these extra hours; (6) that she did not 
waive the overtime by failing to take compensating time off 
when offered, and finally (7) that the amount claimed is the 
cash equivalent of the uncompensated overtime.'' On Feb-
ruary 14, 1950, the letter of the attorney general was for-
warded to the controller together with an interdepartmental 
communication signed by ,James Dean, director of finance, in 
which he referred to the attorney general's letter stating that 
the "seven items which he set forth in his letter already have 
been substantiated, and there is available in our files the re-
quired letters and affidavits making the required substantia-
tion.'' It is argued that these communications constituted a 
tacit approval by the department of Miss 'l'reu's claim for pay-
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ment for overtime. 'l'he statute (Gov. Code, § 18004) provides 
that the required approval by the department must only be 
had before the compensation promised "becomes effective and 
payable'' and does not provide that the approval must be had 
in advance of the time worked for which compensation is 
promised. Mr. Links, assistant director of finance, in response 
to a question as to whether the department had approved the 
claim, testified that '' [ w] hat ~we did was merely to report to 
the State Controller, as we had requested him to withhold the 
drawing of the warrant for the payment thereof until we had 
substantiated the facts." Thereafter, on February 14th, as 
has been hereinbefore set forth, a letter was written by the 
department to the controller in which it was stated "there is 
available in our files the reqttired letters and affidavits making 
the required s~tbstantiation." I am satisfied that it can be in-
ferred from this evidence that the conduct of the Department 
of Finance amounted to an approval of the agreement for over-
time pay between Miss Treu and the lieutenant governor. 
The state relies upon section 13370 of the Government Code 
in support of its contention that ''All contracts entered into 
by any state agency . . . for services shall not be effective 
unless and until approved by the Department of Finance." 
This section adds nothing to the discussion heretofore had. 
As has been seen, the department impliedly approved Miss 
Treu 's claim for overtime compensation and the trial court 
so found. In this regard it should be noted that Miss Treu 
alleged in Paragraph XII all the facts necessary to show that 
the Department of Finance approved her claim. She alleged 
"That on the 14th day of February, 1950, the said James S. 
Dean informed the respondent, Thomas H. Kuchel, that certain 
facts necessary to be established to make said claim valid had 
been substantiated and that there was available in the files 
of said James S. Dean the required letters and affidavits mak-
ing the required substantiation. The facts so substantiated and 
established are : 
'' 1. That the said Lieutenant Governor did establish normal 
hours of work for petitioner; 
"2. That said Lieutenant Governor did promise petitioner 
compensating time off for extra hours worked; 
'' 3. That said promise was made prior to the time said hours 
were worked; 
'' 4. That petitioner was authorized to and did work the extra 
hours claimed; 
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"5. did not reeeive time oil' 
or other 
of separation; 
"6. That petitioner did not waive the extra hours claimed 
by failure to take time off for said hours when 
offered; 
"7. The amount claimed is the cash of the un-
compensated overtime.'' 
In addition, all the substantiating facts are alleged. 'l'lie 
trial court found the allegations of this paragraph to be true 
and, in addition, found that the allegations of the answer deny-
ing the same were untrue. These findings are sufficient to 
establish the implied approval of the department. In holding 
that this is not a sufficient finding on the issue of approval by 
the department of finance, a majority of this court is, by a 
highly technical and wholly unnecessary construction thereof, 
depriving a working person of wages earned for work done 
honestly and conscientiously in reliance upon the promise of 
one of the highest ofi1cers of this state. It is at once apparent 
from a reading of the reporter's transcript as it relates the 
testimony of Mr. Links, Assistant Director of Finance, on 
direct and cross-examination, that the case was tried on the 
theory that approval by the Department of Finance was at 
ISSUe. 
It is next argued that where a public employee has a fixed 
monthly salary there can be no such thing as ''extra'' hours, 
or days, as a basis for overtime pay, and that Miss Treu 's 
monthly salary was the only compensation to which she was 
entitled. Robinson v. Dnnn, 77 Cal. 473 [19 P. 878, 11 Am. 
St.Rep. 297], is relied upon in support of this contention. In 
the Robinson case, the Legislature sought to authorize addi-
tional payment for certain employees whose wages were fixed 
by law at $4.00 per clay because these employees were obliged 
to work 16 hours per day rather than the hours comprising a 
normal working day. It was there held that the word "day" 
''as used in the statute, covers whatever period of the twenty-
four hours the legislators choose to remain in session. . . . 'rhe 
services, therefore, were not 'extra,' but were such as the 
employees were bound to render." The situation in the Rob-
inson case is not analogous to the one under consideration. In 
the instant case, Miss Treu was ordered to work overtime and 
promised additional compensation therefor. The state's argu-
ment that" [t]he length of the work day and of the work week 
having been in the discretion of the appointing power, the 
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work month for which he was paid covers whatever part of the 
month that the power required him to work" and 
" [ t] he therefore, which petitioner here claims she 
worked were not ' ' but were such as she was bound to 
render for her fixed ' shows that the present 
situation differs from that of the Robinson case. The overtime 
hours worked Miss Treu were, in effect, such as would be 
worked an extra since the appointing power-the 
her that she would receive 
extra 
fixed hours of vvork. 'rhe rule announced in Howard 
87 449 [197 P.2d 69], and Clark v. 
499 [133 P.2d 11], now 
opinions in Martin v. Henderson 
and Redwine v. HencleTson Cal.2d 583 [255 P.2d 416}) 
was in full force and effect during the time Miss Treu worked 
for the lieutenant govenwr and during the time this case has 
been under judicial review. The disapproval of the rule that 
a state einployee, in the absence of statutory authority, is en-
titled to for accrued overtime upon separation from 
should not be permitted to operate retroactively so as 
to Miss Treu of a vested right. In Hildebrand v. State 
Bar, 36 Cal.2d 514 P.2d 508], this court said: " ... 
it is our conclusion that the ends of justice will be served by 
dismissing the without disciplinary action, 
permitting this as the first expression of the 
vie1vs of this court upon the to serve prospectively as 
a guide to the members of the profession generally, rather than 
to serve retrospectively to the detriment of petitioners." A 
note in 85 American Law 262 points out that the gen-
eral principle is that a decision of a court of supreme juris-
diction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its 
operation, and the efrect is not that the former decision was 
bad law, but that it never vvas the law. It is also noted, how-
ever, that to this the courts have established the exception 
that, where a constitutional or statute law has received a given 
construction by the courts of last resort, and contracts have 
been made and rights acquired under and in accordance with 
such construction, such contracts may not be invalidated nor 
vested rights acquired under them impaired by a change of 
eonstruction made by a subsequent decision. ''The true rule 
in sueh cases is held to be to a change of judicial construc-
tion in respect to a statute the same effect in its operation on 
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contracts and existing contract rights that would be given to 
a legislative repeal or amendment; that is to say, make it pro-
spective, btd not 1·etroactive." (Emphasis added.) (See, also, 
People v. IYlaughs, 149 Cal. 253 [86 P. 187]; People v. Ryan, 
152 Cal. 364 [92 P. 853] .) Good faith and fair dealing by 
state officers should not only be presumed, but enforced. To 
hold that the disapproval of the cited cases operates retro-
actively deprives Miss Treu of compensation for services ren-
dered in good faith in reliance upon not only the promise of 
her employer (which was impliedly approved by the Depart-
ment of Finance) who held one of the highest offices in this 
state, but in reliance upon decisions rendered by the highest 
judicial tribunals of this state. Neither Miss Treu, her attor-
ney, nor the trial court or the District Court of Appeal could 
have known that Howard v. Larn.pton, S1tpra, and Clark v. 
State Personnel Board, supra, were to be disapproved in 
Martin v. Henderson and Redwine v. Henderson, supra. If this 
case was tried on the theory of the rule laid down in those 
cases, this court should not now penalize Miss Treu for having 
done so but should construe the pleadings and the findings 
liberally to the end that justice would be accomplished. 
The final contention made by the state is that Miss Treu was 
paid in full for all overtime by a special salary adjustment 
granted her with the approval of the Department of Finance. 
On July 16, 1947, the lieutenant governor wrote to Mr. Links of 
the Department of Finance that the ''salaries'' of his em-
ployees should be increased to certain specified amounts for 
the year. The trial court found that Miss Treu did not receive 
compensation for the overtime hours worked. There is ample 
evidence in the record in support of that finding and the im-
plication is clear that the fixed salary received by Miss Treu 
was to cover her fixed hours of work in view of the express 
promise of her employer, the lieutenant governor, to com-
pensate her for overtime worked. 
Other points raised by the state do not merit discussion 
inasmuch as there are really only two primary issues involved 
-whether or not the lieutenant governor and Miss Treu en-
tered into a contract for the payment to her of extra compensa-
tion for overtime work and whether or not that contract was 
approved by the Department of Finance. On both of these 
issues, the trial court found in her favor and there is ample 
evidence in support thereof. 
For the foregoing reasons, I feel compelled to say that 
the present majority holding in this case results in a totally 
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unnecessary miscarriage of justice and does nothing to pro-
mote respect for the fair dealing of a prominent state official 
who has been prevented from keeping his word which was 
given in sincerity and honesty in return for work conscien-
tiously done. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
SHENK, J., and SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-In our view 
the evidence adequately supports the essential findings and 
such findings, construed favorable to the judgment (see 
Richter v. Walker (1951), 36 Oal.2d 634,640 [226 P.2d 593]), 
are sufficient to sustain it. Accordingly we would affirm the 
judgment. 
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